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Abstract
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian
games.  One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where
players are learning about the distribution of Nature￿s move as well as learning about the
opponents￿ strategies.   A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are
necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady
state of a learning process.
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1. Introduction
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of
Bayesian games.  One of our goals is to illuminate some of the modeling issues involved
in thinking about learning about opponents￿ strategies when the distribution of Nature￿s
moves is also unknown.  A more specific goal is to investigate the concept of Nash
equilibrium without a common prior, a solution concept that has been applied in a
number of recent economic models.  The status of this solution concept is important,
given the recent popularity of papers that apply it, such as Banerjee and Somanathan
[2001], Piketty [1995], and Spector [2000].
3   We argue that this concept is difficult to
justify as the long-run result of a learning process.  The intuition for this claim is simple:
In order for repeated observations to lead players to learn the distribution of opponents￿
strategies, the signals observed at the end of each round of play must be sufficiently
informative. Such information will tend to lead players to also have correct and hence
identical beliefs about the distribution of Nature￿s moves.  While our basic argument is
straightforward, our examples highlight some less obvious points.
It is known that in simultaneous-move complete-information games, if players
observe the profiles of actions played in each round, a wide range of learning processes
have the property that the set of steady states coincide with the set of Nash equilibria of
the game.  By contrast, we show that with incomplete information, if players begin with
inconsistent priors, there are games in which the Nash equilibria are not steady states of
any plausible learning processes. Moreover, in many games of incomplete information
without a common prior, the assumptions that imply that all Nash equilibria are steady
states imply that many other outcomes are steady states as well, questioning the focus on
only the Nash equilibrium.  At the same time, we do identify some environments and
games where Nash equilibrium without a common prior does have a learning
justification.3
This learning-theoretic critique is related to two other problems of Nash
equilibrium without a common prior.  One is internal consistency: a Nash equilibrium
when players have different priors in general is not a Nash equilibrium when Nature is
replaced with a player who is indifferent among all her choices and who behaves exactly
as did Nature.
4 A related problem (Dekel and Gul [1997]) is that the epistemic
foundations of Nash equilibrium without a common prior are unappealing. The epistemic
foundation for Nash equilibrium relies on a common prior about strategies, and it is not
obvious why we should impose this on the states of Nature underlying the strategic
uncertainty and not on those corresponding to the incomplete information.
In Section 2 we present our basic solution concept, self-confirming equilibrium,
which we motivate as a steady state of a learning process in which there is only one
person in each player role and Nature￿s choice of the state of the world is iid over time.
The relationship between this notion of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
in games of incomplete information with diverse priors is discussed in Section 3.  Finally,
in Section 4 we discuss how the definition of self-confirming equilibrium needs to be
revised if Nature￿s choice is not iid, or if there are many learning agents who are
randomly placed in each player role.
2. The Model
We consider a static simultaneous-move game with I  player roles.
5  ( A l l
parameters of the game, including the number of players, and their possible actions and
types, are assumed to be finite.) In the static game, Nature moves first, determining
players￿ types, which we denote  ii θ ∈Θ . To model cases where the types alone do not
determine the realized payoffs, we also allow Nature to pick  00 θ ∈Θ ; we call this
￿Nature￿s type.￿  Players observe their types, and then simultaneously choose actions
ii aA ∈  as a function of their type, so that a strategy  i σ  for player i  is a map from her
                                                                                                                                                
3 We do not explore these applications in detail, so in particular we do not claim that their use of Nash
equilibrium is inappropriate.  We only want to argue that in the context of incorrect priors, the use of Nash
equilibrium requires more careful justification than is typically given.  In fact, Spector [2000] assumes that
actions are observed while payoffs are not, noting that, while these are fairly extreme assumptions, if
payoffs were observed then the players would learn the true distribution of Nature￿s move.
4 This is because in a Nash equilibrium the strategy of the player replacing Nature is known.
5 Fudenberg and Kreps [1988, 1995] and Fudenberg and Levine [1993] examined learning and steady states
in games with non-trivial extensive forms; we do not consider such games so as to focus on the role of
incomplete information and incorrect priors.4
types to mixed actions. Player i￿s utility  (,) i ua θ  depends on the profile
1 ( ,..., ) I aa a = A ∈  of realized actions, and on the realization  01 ( , ,..., ) I θθ θ θ =∈ Θ of
Nature￿s move. When  (,) (, ) ii i ua ua θθ =  we refer to the game as having private values.
For any finite set X, we let ∆ () X denote the space of probability distributions over X.
Thus player i￿s prior about Nature￿s move is denoted 
i µ ∈∆ Θ () ;  µµµ = {, . . .}
1 I  is the
profile of priors.  When 
ij µµ =  for all i and j, the game has a common prior; in the
complementary case where µµ
ij ≠  for some i and j we say that the priors are diverse.  
Our solution concept is motivated by thinking about a learning environment in
which the game given above is played repeatedly. We suppose that players know their
own payoff functions and the sets of possible moves by Nature (Θ ) and players (A); but
they know neither the strategies used by other players nor the distribution of Nature￿s
move; the players learn about these latter variables from their observations after each
period of play.  We also suppose that each period the types are drawn independently over
time from a fixed distribution p.  Thus p corresponds to the true distribution of Nature￿s
move in the stage game, and when 
i p µ =  for all players i we say that the priors are
correct.
6  For the time being, we also assume that there is a single agent in each player
role.  Section 4 discusses the case where there is a large population of agents in each role
who are matched together to play the game; we also discuss there the possibility that
types are generated by a more general stochastic process.
Of course, what players might learn from repeated play depends on what they
observe at the end of each round of play.  To model this, we suppose that after each play
of the game, players receive private signals  (,) i ya θ  which is their only information about
Nature￿s and their opponents￿ moves.  It is natural to assume that players observe their
own actions and types, but whether or not they observe others￿ actions, or their own and
others￿ payoffs, depends on the observation structure and will affect which outcomes can
arise in a steady state. We assume that each player observes her own private signal  i y ,
along with her own action and own type.
7
                                                
6 Note that if players are Bayesians they will have a ￿prior￿ about the state of the overall learning process,
and this prior need not be the fixed ￿prior￿  i ￿  that is taken as data in the specification of the stage game.
We call the latter objects ￿priors￿ to conform to past usage, but the language is inaccurate once we set the
stage game in a repeated learning setting.
7  We consider the case in which knowledge of opponents￿ play comes only from learning by observation
and updating, and not from deduction based on opponents￿ rationality, so we do not require that players
know their opponents￿ utility functions or beliefs.  Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1994] explore steady states in5
We will not formally model the dynamics of learning, but will appeal informally
to the idea that a steady state of a belief-based learning process must be a unitary self-
confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine  [1993]). Thus, our focus is on how the
information that players observe at the end of each round of play determines the set of
self-confirming equilibria, and how these equilibria relate to the Nash equilibria of the
game.
The key components of self-confirming (and Nash) equilibrium are each player i￿s
beliefs about Nature￿s move, her strategy, and her conjecture about the strategies used by
her opponents. Player i￿s beliefs, denoted by  ! µ
i , are a point in the space ∆Θ()  of
distributions over Nature￿s move, and her strategy is a map σ ii i A :( ) Θ∆ → . The space of
all such strategies is denoted Σ i , and the player￿s conjectures about opponents￿ play are
assumed to be a  ￿ i σ −   ∈× −− ii Σ , that is, a strategy profile of i￿s opponents. The notation
ˆ (| ) i
i ￿ θ ⋅  refers to the conditional distribution corresponding to  ! µ
i  and θ i , while
(|) i ii a σθ  denotes the probability that  ( ) ii σθ  assigns to ai .
Definition: A strategy profile σ  is a self-confirming equilibrium with conjecture  ￿ i σ −
and beliefs  ￿i µ  if for each player i,
(i) p i () θ > 0 implies  ! () µθ ii > 0,
and for any pair  ￿ , ii a θ  such that  ￿￿ () (|) 0
i
ii i i a µθ σ θ ⋅>  both the following conditions are
satisfied
(ii)
, ˆ ˆˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( | ) ( | ) i i ii
i
a ii i i i i i i i i a au a a a
θ θθ ￿ θθ σ θ
−− −− − − − − ∈ ∑ ,
and
(iii)
ˆ {,: ( ,, ,) }
ˆ {,: ( ,, ,) }
ˆ ˆ (| ) (|)
(| ) (|) .
ii i ii ii i
ii i ii ii i
i
iiii i ay a a y









−− − − =
−− − − = =
∑
∑
                                                                                                                                                
learning processes where there is common knowledge of rationality, and Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine
[1999] consider the case of almost common knowledge of rationality.6
We say that σ  is a self-confirming equilibrium if there is some profile  ￿￿ (,) µ σ  such that
(i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
8
Condition (i) is a consequence of the assumption that players observe their own
types.  Condition (ii) says that any action played by a type of player i that has positive
probability is a best response to her conjecture about opponents￿ play and beliefs about
Nature￿s move. Condition (iii) says that the distribution of signals (conditional on type)
that the player expects to see equals the actual distribution. This captures the least amount
of information that we would expect to arise as the steady state of a learning process.
We will sometimes consider the restriction of self-confirming equilibria to the
case where players￿ beliefs about Nature satisfy certain restrictions.  In particular, we say
that a self-confirming equilibrium has ￿independent beliefs￿ if for all players i the beliefs
￿
i µ  are a product measure. Because the domain of  ￿
i µ  is all of  01 ... I Θ× Θ× Θ ,
independence implies that player i￿s  beliefs about the types of her opponents do not
depend on her own type.  This restriction is most easily motivated in games where the
true distribution p is a product measure, that is, players￿ types are in fact independent, as
in this case assuming independent beliefs amounts to saying that players understand this
particular fact about the structure of the game. The following game demonstrates the
effect of assuming independent beliefs.
Example 1: Independent Beliefs
Consider a one-person two-type two-action game with two different states in  0 Θ . The
actions are labeled In and Out; the types are labeled ￿Timid￿ (T) and ￿Brave￿ (B), the  0 Θ
states are labeled L and R. Both types get a payoff of 0 from Out.  Payoffs from In are
given in the table below.
                                                
8 Battigalli [1988] and Kalai and Lehrer [1993] defined similar concepts.  This is the ￿unitary￿ version of
self-confirming equilibria because it supposes that there is a single  ˆ i σ−  for each player i. The unitary
version of the concept is appropriate here because of our assumption that there is a single agent in each
player role; when we discuss large populations and matching in Section 4 we will need to allow for
heterogeneous beliefs.  Note that i￿s beliefs about opponents￿ play take the form of a strategy profile as
opposed to a probability distribution over strategy profiles. The complications that arise due to correlations
in conjectures are discussed in Fudenberg and Kreps [1988] and Fudenberg and Levine [1993]; we simplify




Notice that In is a dominant strategy for the Brave type. Suppose the player does not
observe Nature￿s move but does observe her own payoff.
9  Suppose also that the objective
distribution p on Nature￿s move assigns equal probability to the four states (B, L), (B, R),
(T, L) and (T, R).  The Brave type has In as a dominant strategy, and so Brave will go In
in every self-confirming equilibrium.  Thus, since the player observes her payoff, the
Brave type learns the distribution of Nature￿s move conditional on Brave, so the only
self-confirming equilibrium with independent beliefs has  ￿ p µ =  and both types playing
In.  However, there is also a self-confirming equilibrium without independent beliefs
where the Timid type stays Out because the player believes that Nature plays R whenever
the player is Timid, that is  ￿ (|)1
i RT µ = .   ■
We are interested in the relationship between the set of self-confirming equilibria
and the set of Nash equilibria.  In a Nash equilibrium, each player￿s strategy must
maximize her expected payoff given her prior about the distribution of θ  and correct
conjectures about the play of the opponents.
Definition: A strategy profile σ  is a Nash equilibrium with conjecture  ￿ i σ −  and beliefs
￿i µ  if for each player i, and for any pair  ￿ , ii a θ  such that  ˆ ˆ () () 0 i
ii i a ￿ θσ ⋅ >
(ii)
, ˆ ˆˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( | ) ( | ) i i ii
i
a ii i i i i i i i i a au a a a
θ θθ ￿ θθ σ θ
−− −− − − − − ∈ ∑ ,
and
(iii’) ￿ ii σσ −− = ,  ˆii ￿￿ = .
                                                
9 Note that even though player 1 and Nature move simultaneously, when Nature￿s move is not observed the
problem has the structure of a one-armed bandit, which is normally thought of as a game with a non-trivial
extensive form.8
Note in particular that (iii’) has the further implication that  () 0
i
i µθ >  implies
ˆ () 0 i
i ￿ θ > .
10
When the priors are diverse, we say that the Nash equilibrium has diverse priors.
Finally, to distinguish the case where the beliefs are correct, that is µ
i p =  for all i, we
say this is a Nash equilibrium with correct priors.
Note that the set of self-confirming equilibria does not depend on the exogenous
stage-game priorsµ . To see why, note that a complete belief-based learning model would
specify priors over both Nature’s probability distribution and opponents’ strategies. These
priors would be updated over time, so that the steady state belief-conjecture pair ( ! µ ,  ￿ i σ − )
need not be the same as the priors. In the learning process, different priors can lead to a
different distribution over steady states; in our definition the set of self-confirming
equilibria corresponds to the set of possible steady states for all initial conditions of the
learning process.
Note also that there need not exist a self-confirming equilibrium where beliefs
coincide with the exogenous prior µ .  For example, if players observe Nature￿s move at
the end of each period, then self-confirming equilibrium requires that the beliefs equal the
objective distribution p.   Conversely, there is always a self-confirming equilibrium with
beliefsµ  if players observe nothing at all, so that the set of outcomes Y has only a single
element, but in that case the set of self-confirming equilibria includes all profiles of ex-
ante undominated strategies.
11 (Since we consider different classes of games and different
assumptions about the signals observed at the end of each round, we end up making
several points.  Since these points do not require lengthy proofs, we do not display them
formally; instead,   we underline them to make them easier to locate.)
                                                
10 This definition of Nash equilibrium allows for a player to believe that an opponent is not optimizing,
since j can assign strictly positive probability to a type of i to which i assigns zero probability.  To deal with
this issue we could state the primitives of the game as conditional probabilities  (| ) i
ii ￿ θθ −  and impose
interim optimality even for own types to which one assigns zero probability.  We chose to avoid this extra
complexity in the notation.
11 The strategies are ex-ante undominated because there is only one agent in each player role, so that an
agent￿s conjectures about the other players￿ strategies must be the same regardless of that agent￿s action and
type, and the belief about Nature must also be conditionally independent of the action chosen given the
type.9
3. The Relationship Between Self-Confirming Equilibria and Nash
Equilibria
In this section we focus on the relationship between  self-confirming equilibria
and Nash equilibria. Specifically we explore the assumptions about observability under
which the set of self-confirming equilibrium profiles with beliefs  ! µµ =  coincide with the
set of Nash equilibrium profiles of the game where players￿ priors regarding Nature are
µ .  We abbreviate this by saying (imprecisely) that the sets of Nash and self-confirming
equilibria with beliefs µ coincide.
3.1 The tension between Nash and self-confirming equilibria
As mentioned above,  if players cannot observe or deduce their opponents￿ actions
at the end of each period, then in general there can be self-confirming equilibria that are
not Nash equilibria. So we begin by considering the case in which players either directly
observe, or indirectly deduce from other observations, the realized actions of their
opponents after each play of the game.   
Suppose that  ii yu = , that is, players observe their own utility. With generic
payoffs the map  (,) i ua θ  is 1-1, and both the actions of other players,  i a− , and Nature￿s
move,  θ , can be uniquely determined from  i y . Consequently, the only beliefs and
conjectures that are self-confirming are the correct ones.  We conclude that with generic
and observed payoffs, the set of self-confirming equilibria coincides with the set of Nash
equilibria of the game with the correct (hence common) prior.   In particular, if the priors
in a given game of incomplete information are not common, and in addition, if the set of
Nash equilibria of that game differs from the set of Nash equilibria with the correct prior
(that is if the presumption of diverse priors has any significance), then the Nash equilibria
of the game with diverse priors will not coincide with the self-confirming equilibria.
Next suppose that  ii ya − = , that is, players observe their opponents￿ actions.
Then in a self-confirming equilibrium players must know the conditional distribution of
opponents￿ actions given their own type.  Suppose in addition that the game is a game of
private values, that is,  (,) (, ) ii i ua ua θθ = .  Since players do not care about their
opponents￿ types, this implies that with private values and observed actions every self-10
confirming equilibrium has the same strategies as a Nash equilibrium of the game with
the correct and hence common priors.
12,13 Once again, the fact that self-confirming
equilibria are Nash equilibria of the game with the correct prior implies in particular that
when such games have diverse priors, then any Nash equilibria that are not Nash in the
game with correct priors are not self -confirming.  That is, if the diverse priors create any
additional Nash equilibria, those equilibria are not self-confirming.
14 This is
demonstrated in Example 2 below.
Example 2: Nash Equilibria that are Not Self-Confirming Equilibria
We consider a game with a column player, C, and two row players, R1 and R2.  Nature
chooses L or R, with equal probability; the column player observes Nature￿s choice of L
or R, while the two other players do not. Thus players R1 and R2 each have a single type,
player C has two types, L and R, and the set Θ 0 of Nature￿s types is empty.
In this game, C￿s payoff depends only on her own action and type, but not on the
actions taken by the row players: specifically, C￿s actions are labeled l and r, and C gets 1
for choosing the same as Nature, and 0 for choosing the opposite. The row players￿
payoffs each depend on the column player￿s action and their own action, as shown in the
following two matrices.
                                                
12 Note that the beliefs about opponents￿ types and strategies may not correspond to the Nash equilibrium;
we return to this question in other contexts below.
13 In this case the specification of assumptions about player￿s prior knowledge of the game is irrelevant for
long-run learning. It may however make a difference for predictions of the model about play in the first few
periods, before much learning has taken place, and so can also influence the long-run behavior of the system
in cases where a steady state is not reached.
14 Note that in two-person games with private values (in which by implication θ 0  is irrelevant) the set of
Nash equilibria of a game with diverse priors depends only on the support of the priors and equals the set of
Nash equilibria of the same game with common priors (and the same support). The key point is that a
player￿s prior about her own type does not matter to him, and so there is no harm in modifying it to reflect
her opponent￿s belief.  In a similar vein, neither player cares about Nature￿s type θ 0 .  Formally, if σ  is a
Nash equilibrium where player 1￿s prior on  12 Θ× Θ is
11 1
12 µµ µ =× , and two￿s prior is 
22 2
12 µµ µ =× ,
then it is also an equilibrium when the priors are both 
21
12 µµ × .11
R1 l r R2 l r
U 01 U 10
M ￿￿ M ￿￿
D 10 D 01
This is a game with private values, because the row players’ payoffs depend only
on the column player￿s action, not her type.  In the learning environment, everyone
observes the column player￿s action after the game is played.  Clearly the column player
has a dominant strategy of playing l when type L and r when type R, so in the self-
confirming equilibrium, the column player plays l on L and r on R, so plays each half the
time. The row players observe this, so must play M.
Now suppose that R1￿s prior assigns probability .9 to type L and .1 to R, while
R2￿s prior is the reverse, with .1 probability of type L and .9 to R.   In a Nash equilibrium,
C plays l upon observing L and r upon observing R, and the row players know this.
Given the priors, this implies that R1 and R2 believe that they will face the actions l and r
respectively .9 of the time. Consequently, in this Nash equilibrium with diverse priors, R1
and R2 will both choose D.  However, this is not a Nash equilibrium for any common
prior, and so it is not a self-confirming equilibrium for any p when the column player￿s
action is observed.
15
We see in this example that, when players observe actions, the self-confirming
equilibria in which beliefs are equal to the priors is unique, and is different from the Nash
equilibrium.  When players observe nothing at all, the set of self-confirming equilibria
with beliefs equal to the priors includes the Nash equilibrium, but in fact imposes no
restrictions at all on the play by R1 and R2 since the row players will not know anything
about columns choice.  ■
                                                
15 One way of summarizing this example is to say that two players who agree about an opponent￿s strategy
can have different forecasts about the distribution of that opponent￿s actions if they have different beliefs
about the distribution of that player￿s type.  In contrast, with observed actions players correctly forecast the
distribution of opponent￿s actions in any self-confirming equilibrium, but they can have different beliefs
about the distribution of Nature￿s move and about the opponent￿s strategy.12
Without private values, if neither types nor payoffs are observed, but actions are,
there can be self-confirming equilibria with correct beliefs about Nature that are not Nash
even with correct priors, as in the next example.
Example 3: Self-confirming equilibria that are not Nash
Player R and player C each choose either ￿1 or 1. Player R￿s type is either +1 (with
probability 2/3) or ￿1 (with probability 1/3), and player R￿s payoff is her action times her
type, so player R plays +1 when type 1 and ￿1 when type ￿1.   Player C￿s payoff is the
product of player 1￿s type and the two actions, so the unique Nash equilibrium with the
correct prior has player C play +1.  If all that player C observes is player R￿s action, then
player C can have correct beliefs about Nature￿s move and conjecture that player R plays
+1 when type ￿1 and mixes ‰- ‰ when type +1. In this case the best response is for
player C to play ￿1. Consequently, player C plays ￿1 in all self-confirming equilibria.  ■
By assuming that players observe very little (or that payoffs are not generic) it is
easier for a Nash equilibrium with diverse priors to also be a self-confirming equilibrium.
However, the less the players observe when the game is played, the less they learn about
opponents￿ strategies, so the bigger the set of self-confirming equilibria, which makes it
more likely that the set of self-confirming equilibria contains equilibria that are not Nash.
This tension is noted following Example 2 above; to further illustrate it we consider the
following team problem, based on the model of Banerjee and Somanathan [2001].
Example 4: Nash Equilibria and Self-confirming equilibria in a Team Problem
Nature chooses either 0 or 1.  The team as a group needs to choose a single action
in {0, 1}; each player￿s utility is 1 if the action matches Nature￿s choice and 0 otherwise.
There is a continuum of players on the unit interval, i Œ[,] 01 .  The game does not have
common prior; instead, each player i believes that Nature plays ￿1￿ with probability i.
Nature￿s actual probability is some fixed p not too far from ‰.  One of the players is
chosen as the decision-maker.  All other players observe a noisy signal that takes value 1
or 0, where for each player the probability that the signal value equals Nature￿s choice is
α  >1/2.  After observing these signals, one player is chosen at random to send the13
decision-maker a message in {0, 1}. The decision-maker does not observe the identity of
the sender, and then chooses the group￿s action.
This game has several Nash equilibria. One of these, which seems analogous to
those on which Banerjee and Somanathan focused, has an interval of players of measure t
around the decision maker send the message that corresponds to their signal.  In the two
intervals of measure  () 1/ 2 t −  consisting of players with more extreme priors players
ignore their signals and always send 0 and 1, depending on whether they are at the ￿right￿
or ￿left￿ extreme.   We now explore whether this Nash equilibrium (with diverse priors)
is a self-confirming equilibrium under different assumptions regarding what players
observe when the game is played.
  Obviously if players observe the true state at the end of each period they will learn
the actual distribution of Nature￿s move, so diverse priors would not persist.  If players
observe their own payoff and the decision-maker￿s action they would also learn the
distribution of Nature￿s move.  On the other hand, if the signal senders observe only their
payoffs, and the decision maker observes nothing but her action, the Nash equilibrium is
a self-confirming equilibrium with the given beliefs about Nature and the correct
conjectures about players￿ strategies because in this equilibrium the distribution over
payoffs is (1-t)/2+α t, independent of the state.
16  The Nash equilibrium is also a self-
confirming equilibrium if the players observe actions but not payoffs; but once again in
this case there are other self-confirming equilibria as well. Finally, if the decision-maker
observes her payoff, she can deduce the state and thereby learn the true distribution; in
this case the Nash equilibrium is a self-confirming equilibrium only if the decision-
maker￿s prior is correct. ■
We have seen that observing actions is not sufficient for Nash and self-confirming
equilibria with given beliefs µ  to coincide.  The next example sharpens this point. Even
if the set of strategy profiles in self confirming equilibria  with beliefs  ˆ ￿￿ =  coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria, conjectures about opponents￿ play may fail to be correct,
                                                
16 There may be other SCE, but as the original paper does not analyze the whole set of Nash equilibria, we
only emphasize here the stringent assumptions necessary to make the particular Nash equilibrium they
consider correspond to a self-confirming equilibrium with the same beliefs.14
and so the profile can fail to be self-confirming once actions are added to the available
information.
Example 5: A game where when payoffs are observed,  Nash equilibrium and self-
confirming equilibrium are equivalent iff actions are not observed.
Consider a two-player game in which Nature chooses the left or right matrix.  Neither
player has private information; both players think the left matrix is chosen with
probability 1 ε − , while it is actually chosen with probability ε .
AB AB
A 1, 1 0, 0 A 0, 0 1, 1
B 0, 0 0, 0 B 1, 1 0, 0
The strategic form for this game given the common beliefs µ  is
The unique Nash equilibrium is (A, A).
If players only observe their payoffs, then (A, A) is a self-confirming equilibrium with
beliefs (1 ε − ,ε ) and conjecture that the opponent is playing B: in this case each player
believes that playing A yields 1 with probabilityε , and B yields 0. However, if players
observe actions, the Nash equilibrium (A, A) is not self confirming. ■
3.2  Examples where Nash equilibria and self-confirming equilibria
coincide
Example 2 showed that when players observe everyone￿s actions there could be
Nash equilibria that are not self-confirming with respect to any beliefs.  Our next example
shows a sort of converse: for some games with diverse priors, the Nash equilibria and
self-confirming equilibria do coincide, whether or not players observe actions.  In this
example the diverse priors are significant: the set of Nash (and self-confirming) equilibria
AB
A 1-ε , 1-ε ε , ε
B ε , ε 0, 015
with the diverse priors differs from the set of Nash (and self-confirming) equilibria with a
common prior.  The example demonstrates this point using ex-ante dominating strategies,
in which it is irrelevant what players observe; in an example in the appendix the players
do care about their opponents￿ actions, and in that example players must observe either
their own payoffs, or opponents￿ actions, or both.
Example 6: A game where Nash equilibrium  and self-confirming equilibrium coincide
even with diverse priors
LR LR
U 1, 1 0, 0 U -1, -1 0,0
D 0, 0 -1, -1 D 0, 0 1, 1
This is a two-player game in which Nature chooses the left (l) or right (r) payoffs, and
neither player observes Nature￿s move.  The row player believes the left payoffs are
chosen, the column player believes the opposite:
12 () () 1 lr µµ == . So the unique Nash
equilibrium is for the row player to play U and the column player R, with payoffs (0, 0).
Whether or not players observe their opponent￿s actions or their own utility, this profile is
self-confirming with beliefs equal to the given priors. However, the subset of self-
confirming equilibria with beliefs in which  !! µµ
12 = is either (U, L), (D, R), or the entire
strategy space. ■
To summarize, we have seen that observing actions is neither necessary nor
sufficient for self confirming and Nash equilibria to coincide, and that when payoffs are
observable, observing actions in addition may make a Nash equilibrium that was self-
confirming no longer so.  Thus, we see that the ￿best￿ case for Nash and self-confirming
equilibria to coincide is when actions are observable and payoffs are not. Moreover, we
saw that this assumption can only be useful when the game is not one of private values.
Then, if  0 (,) (, , ) ii i ua ua θθ θ = , and if players observe actions and not payoffs, they can
correctly infer opponents￿ distribution of actions as a function of their own type.
However, while this forces them to agree about the distribution of private types, it does
not force them to agree about  0 θ , the portion of Nature￿s move that is unknown to16
everyone. So in a self-confirming equilibrium players may disagree about the distribution
of  0 θ  and how it is correlated with the private types.    In this class of games, where each
player￿s utility depends only on that player￿s type and the type of Nature, the Nash
equilibria coincide with the self-confirming equilibria when actions are observed but
payoffs are not. A practical example that has this flavor is the case of voting by juries.
Assume that jurors all wish to convict the guilty and release the innocent, and have the
same preferences of the cost of making a mistake. Here we would take  0 θ  to be whether
or not the defendant is guilty, and suppose that there are no private types. Since they
never get to observe whether a defendant is actually guilty they do not observe their own
payoffs. But if some jurors get to participate in many trials, or hear about the
deliberations of many juries, they may learn the strategies of other players, even though
they never acquire any information about the correctness or incorrectness of their beliefs
about the relationship between evidence and guilt.
Next consider more general games, in which players do care directly about
opponents￿ types. The Nash equilibria will coincide with the self-confirming equilibria
with the same beliefs if players observe opponents￿ types and actions, but do not observe
their  own payoffs, and if additionally the priors over private types are correct.  (That is,
the marginal of µ  on players￿ types coincides with the marginal of p on players￿ types.)
4. The Joint Distribution of Nature’s Moves over Time, Agents, and
Players
4.1.  Correlation Over Time
The assumption we made in Section 2 to justify self-confirming equilibrium as the
steady state of a learning process is that Nature makes independent draws from p each
period. However, there are stochastic processes generating agents￿ types that, loosely
speaking, ￿draw types according to p￿ but where p turns out not to be directly relevant for
the long-run outcome.  For example, Nature might make a single once-and-for-all draw
￿ θ  from p, so that the ￿real game￿ about which learning occurs corresponds to the
particular realization of  ￿ θ .  In this case, the ￿appropriate￿ definition of self-confirming
equilibrium replaces p in condition (ii) with the degenerate distribution that chooses  ˆ θ17
with probability one.  This is ￿appropriate￿ in the sense that the players learn only about
the particular draw, and so steady states of a learning procedure will coincide with the
self-confirming equilibria when p is replaced in this manner.  In the remainder of this
section we point out, for various stochastic processes, what is the ￿appropriate￿
replacement of p.
Obviously the fact that the realized  ˆ θ  differs from  p  can have significant
implications for what is learned.  For instance, in the case just mentioned, players may
learn the true state.  The next example illustrates another possible implication: the players
might learn the state for some realizations of  ￿ θ  and not for others.
Example 7: Learning about only some states
Consider again the one-player game of Example 1, where the payoffs for Out are 0




As before, suppose the player does not observe Nature￿s move but does observe her own
payoff.  But now suppose also that the objective distribution p assigns probability ‰ to
(B, L) and ‰ (T, L) so that Nature￿s type is always L. As before, the only self-confirming
equilibrium with independent beliefs is for both types to play In, but this solution concept
is not appropriate in the case when  ￿ θ  is drawn once from p  and then fixed. The
supposition underlying self-confirming equilibrium is that player i has a single belief  ￿
i µ
over  Θ  that is possibly updated based on  i θ . This makes sense when a given agent gets
many observations of games with each possible realization of  i θ . With a single draw,
however, we need to allow for each type  i θ  to have separate beliefs.  In this case, even
when player i knows that the distribution of Nature￿s type is independent of her own,
there is a self-confirming equilibrium where the Timid type stays Out (believing that
Nature always plays R) while the Brave type plays In believing (correctly) that Nature
always plays L.  ■18
Underlying our notion of a steady state is the idea that players repeatedly sample
from a fixed distribution that does not change over time. Suppose we consider the more
general class of exchangeable processes for types, which have a representation as a
￿prior￿ probability distribution over (conditionally) iid processes. Then we can think of
Nature making a single once-and-for-all draw ￿ p from the class of iid processes, and the
￿appropriate distribution￿ to use in the definition of ￿  self-confirming equilibrium is the
￿ p  drawn by Nature; the fact that players ￿could have￿ faced some different distribution
and that the overall distribution was p is not relevant in the long-run steady state.
17
Thus, we can extend the discussion of independent private values in Section 3,
where we said that every self-confirming equilibrium has the same strategies as a Nash
equilibrium of the game with the correct and hence common priors:  With independent
private values and observed actions of opposing players, a self-confirming equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium in a game with priors equal to the ￿realized distribution￿ of types,  ￿ p .
One can also consider the more general class of ergodic processes instead of
exchangeable ones. It is natural in that case to think of p as the invariant distribution.
Notice in this case that players are not actually drawing from p each period, rather they
are drawing from time-varying distributions which average out to p.  If players believe
that the true process is exchangeable, then beliefs in steady states will still satisfy the self-
confirming conditions of section 2 with respect to this ergodic distribution.
18
4.2  Matching in Large Populations
Next we want to focus on a class of games of special interest in learning theory:
games in which players are randomly matched to play a smaller ￿stage￿ game.  In this
setting it is natural to think of p as the distribution of types for a given match, and not
deal directly with the distribution of types over all matches, but we must also consider the
relationship between the matching process and the p from which players draw their
observations.
                                                
17 Note that the exchangeable model nests both the case of single once-and-for-all draw  ˆ θ  and the case
where each period￿s  θ  is an independent draw from p. Note also that the distribution from which Nature
chooses  ￿ p  does influence the ex-ante distribution over steady states.
18 Of course, sophisticated players might realize that Nature￿s moves do not have an exchangeable
distribution, in which case our model would break down.19
Suppose that players in a given player role are independently matched in each
period with opponents in other roles.  We mention three ways in which types could be
determined over time.  (a) If Nature makes a once-and-for-all draw, the relevant
distribution is generated by independent draws from the realized distribution of  's θ  in
the population. This distribution exhibits independence across player roles on account of
the matching procedure, even if the underlying p exhibited correlation.  For instance, if
types were perfectly correlated according to p, then in any rematch after the first draw
there is positive probability that a profile with zero probability according to p will
nevertheless be matched. (b) If Nature draws independently from a correlated distribution
p each period, and the draw is made prior to matching, a similar observation holds true:
Because the matching is independent of type, the relevant distribution is the product of
the marginals from p. (c) On the other hand, if Nature draws independently each period,
and draws the types for the agents in each match from p after the match is formed, then p
is the relevant distribution.
Now we turn to the question of how the appropriate definition of self-confirming
equilibrium depends on the specification of the stochastic process governing types.  We
know from Fudenberg-Levine [1993] that when there are multiple agents in each player
role, there can be ￿heterogeneous￿ self-confirming equilibria in which different agents in
the same role play different strategies and have different conjectures.  Thus, when types
are chosen independently over time, and separately for each match, the appropriate
definition replaces allows the beliefs and conjectures of the agents to vary with the
strategy chosen.
Definition: A strategy profile σ  is a heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium if for
each player i there exists {: }
k
ii kK σ ∈⊂ Σ  such that  i σ  is in the convex hull of
{: }
k
i kK σ ∈  and such that for each 
k
i σ  there are conjectures  ￿ i σ −  and beliefs  ￿i µ   (both of
which can depend on 
k
i σ ), such that
(i) p i () θ > 0 implies  ! () µθ ii > 0,
and for any pair  ￿ , ii a θ  such that  ￿￿ () (|) 0
i
ii i i a µθ σ θ ⋅>  both the following two conditions
are satisfied
(ii)
, ˆ ˆˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( | ) ( | ) i i ii
i
a ii i i i i i i i i a au a a a
θ θθ ￿ θθ σ θ
−− −− − − − − ∈ ∑ ,20
and
(iii)
ˆ {,: ( ,, ,) }
ˆ {,: ( ,, ,) }
ˆ ˆ (| ) (|)
(| ) (|) .
ii i ii ii i
ii i ii ii i
i
iiii i ay a a y
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This definition allows for player i￿s beliefs and conjecture to depend on the strategy she
plays, but as in the unitary definition it requires all types of player i to form their beliefs
by updating from a common distribution  ￿i µ .   To see the difference this heterogeneity can
make, consider a simplified version of example 7 where the player is always Timid, and
where the distribution of Nature￿s move is such that it is optimal for the player to always
play In.  Then there is no self-confirming equilibrium where the player randomizes, but
there are heterogeneous self-confirming equilibria where some players play In and others
stay Out.
Heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium is appropriate when Nature￿s move is
iid over time (case (c) above), since a given agent eventually receives many observations
of the distribution of signals corresponding to each possible type  i θ  in the support of p.
However, if types are fixed once and for all, then each agent is only in the role of a single
type, and there is no reason that beliefs across types should be consistent with updating
from a common prior.
19  Therefore, instead of imposing that restriction, we allow each
type θ i  to have any  ￿interim belief￿ 
i θ µ "  that is consistent with that type￿s observations.
Similarly, when types are fixed, conjectures may depend on types.  The following notion
of type heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium captures the idea that types are fixed
initially, but that players are subsequently matched with opponents whose types have
been drawn from p.
Definition: A strategy profile σ  is a type heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium if
for each player i, and for each ˆi a  and θ i  such that  ˆ () ( | ) 0 i ii i pa θσ θ ⋅ >  there are
                                                
19 If no restrictions are imposed on the prior, then any collection of interim beliefs () i
ii
θ
θ ￿ ∈Θ !  can be
generated from a prior  i ￿  by setting  (, ) ( ) () ii i i i ii ￿ θθ ￿ θ ￿ θ −− = !  for some marginals  () ii ￿ θ , but the interim
definition allows for each type of player i  to think all types are independently distributed while also
allowing different types to have different beliefs.21
conjectures  ￿ i σ −  and interim beliefs 
i θ µ "   (both of which can depend on  ! ai  and θ i ), such
that both the following conditions are satisfied
 (ii)
, ˆˆ argmax ( , , , ) ( ) ( | ) i
i i ii
a ii i i i i i i i a au a a a θ
θ θθ ￿ θσ θ
−− −− − − − − ∈ ∑ ! ,
(iii)
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Notice that the ￿full support￿ condition (i) is no longer needed, since we no longer derive
the interim (that is, type-dependent) beliefs by updating from an ￿ex-ante” prior.
Returning to example 7, recall that ￿In when Brave, Out when Timid￿ is a self-
confirming equilibrium, since the player can believe that Nature￿s type is correlated with
her own. This is not a self-confirming equilibrium with independent beliefs, and it is not a
heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium with independent beliefs, but it is a type-
heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium with independent beliefs. The same
distinction appears in a modified version of example 7 where ￿Nature￿ is replaced by a
player 2 who has L as a dominant strategy, and where player 1 observes her own payoff
but not the action of player 2. The only self-confirming equilibrium is for both types of
player 1 to play In; this is also the only heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium, but
￿Brave In, Timid Out￿ is a type-heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium. 
20
We conclude with a final example that also uses independence to create a
distinction between heterogeneous and type-heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium.
Example 8: Independent heterogeneous Self-Confirming Equilibria versus Independent
type-heterogeneous Self-Confirming Equilibria
Consider a variation of the one-player game of Example 7, where the payoffs for Out
remain 0 and those for In are
                                                
20 The difference between the versions of the example with ￿Nature￿ and ￿player 2￿ comes from the fact
that player 1 can think Nature￿s move is correlated with her type, but player 1￿s conjecture about player 2
must correspond to a strategy for player 2, and since player 2 does not observe player 1￿s type, player 2￿s




Here both types can stay Out only if they disagree about Nature￿s move: Brave must
believe R and Timid must believe L. Suppose in fact that players observe nothing, so that
behavior depends only on priors. If the players￿ types are drawn anew each period and
beliefs are restricted to be independent, then in any self-confirming equilibrium
() ( ) InO u t σσ ≥  since the beliefs corresponding to any 
k σ  must lead them to play In
either when they are Brave or when they are Timid (or both).  On the other hand, if
players￿ types are drawn once and for all, they can stay Out forever (each type can have
constant beliefs justifying Out).    ■23
Appendix
Since Example 6 involves dominant strategies, it is not very interesting from a
game-theoretic perspective.  The next, more complicated, example, due to Phil Reny,
shows that dominant strategies are not required for the property that the Nash and self-
confirming equilibria coincide even when actions are not observed.
Example A
In this game there are three states of Nature  '
00 0 , '', ''' θθ θ and no types. There are two
players, a row and a column player; each chooses between three actions T, M, B. Payoffs
in each of the states is given in the table below.
0 ' θ 0 '' θ 0 ''' θ
TMB T MB TMB
T 0, 1 0, ‰ 1, -1 T 0, -1 0, ‰ -1, 1 T 0, 1 0, 5 1, 1
M 5, 0 5, 5 ‰, 5 M 5, 0 5, 5 ‰, 0 M 5, 0 5, 5 5, 0
B 0, 0 0, 5 -1, 0 B 0, 0 0, 5 1, 0 B 0, 0 0, 5 1, 0
Beliefs about and the actual distribution of Nature￿s move are given below
0 ' θ 0 '' θ 0 ''' θ
µ 1 1-2εε ε
µ 2 ε 1-2εε
µε ε 1-2ε
To analyze the game, note that if 2 plays T or M it is a strict best response for 1 to play M;
if 1 plays M or B it is a strict best response for 2 to play M. Hence the relevant portion of
the game involves 2 playing B or 1 playing T. Payoffs in these cases are summarized
below.24
0 ' θ 0 '' θ ' θ
1- 1 1
‰‰ 5
u1 (T, B, θ 0)=u2 (T, T, θ 0)=
u1 (M, B, θ 0)=u2 (T, M, θ 0)=
u1 (B, B, θ 0)=u2 (T, B, θ 0)= -1 1 1
With the given priors the pure strategy Nash equilibria are (M, M) and (T, B).  The latter
is not a Nash equilibrium with a common prior.  If players observe payoffs, then there are
two (pure strategy) self-confirming equilibria with beliefs µ 1, µ 2: one with the strategy
profiles (T, B) and the other with (M, M).25
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